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Indelible Ink in the Milk*: Adoption of the Inclusionary
Approach to Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in State v. Coffey
It was tragic The defendant had, on several occasions, taken up
with divorced women so he could have access to their children. He had
sexually abused four other children before this little girl. The govern-
ment either couldn't or didn't introduce any of this prior conduct at the
defendant's trial The jury acquitted. When some of the jurors subse-
quently found out about the prior incidents, they were furious. "If only
we'd known about them, we'd have convicted the guy" 1
The issue of admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is the most liti-
gated evidentiary issue in most federal and state appellate courts.2 The multi-
tude of litigation in this area no doubt results from the highly prejudicial effect
this type of evidence has on judges, juries, and lay-persons3 in both civil and
criminal cases.4 The North Carolina Supreme Court, like most state and federal
courts, traditionally recognized the impact of this type of evidence on a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial by adopting a general exclusionary rule, with a limited
number of well-recognized exceptions.5 The court further protected defendants
from unrestrained admission of prior uncharged acts by requiring that evidence
of these acts be substantially similar to and not too remote in time from the
charged crime.6 Since Congress adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and
numerous state legislatures adopted corresponding state versions of that rule,7
many courts in these jurisdictions have relaxed significantly-if not eliminated-
the evidentiary constraints on the admissibility of this highly prejudicial class of
evidence.8
* The title originates from a colorful remark in a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit involving the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence: "A drop
of ink cannot be removed from a glass of milk." Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir.
1976).
1. The opening quotation is borrowed from the beginning of a law review article on admission
of evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct with children. Hutton, Prior Bad Acts Evidence
in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D.L. REv. 604, 604 (1989).
2. See 22 C. WRiGuT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5239, at 427 (1978).
3. E. IMWINKELIUED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:03 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
4. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (noting that rule 404(b) applies
to both civil and criminal cases).
5. See State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 173-76, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366-68 (1954).
6. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1988); State v. Scott, 318
N.C. 237, 248, 347 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1986); State v. Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 106-07, 305 S.E.2d 542,
544-45 (1983); State v. Shane, 304 N.C. 643, 654-56, 285 S.E.2d 813, 820-21 (1982), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1104 (1984). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
7. See, ag., N.C.R. EVID. 404(b) (1986). For North Carolina's version of rule 404(b), see
infra note 43.
8. See Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1467-68 (1985). For a discussion of
Congress' adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the rule's subsequent effects on the
federal courts' approach to uncharged misconduct evidence, see infra notes 83-90 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of state courts' reactions to their legislatures' adoption of a version of rule
404(b), see infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
In State v. Coffey9 the North Carolina Supreme Court followed this trend
and abrogated the traditional procedural safeguards against admission of this
highly prejudicial class of evidence. The court ruled that evidence of the defend-
ant's prior sexual misconduct was admissible to show motive and intent in a trial
for the murder of a ten-year-old girl.'0 In upholding the trial court's admission
of the evidence, the Coffey court announced that a "clear general rule of inclu-
sion" governs the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence under rule
404(b). 1 The court stated that the adoption of rule 404(b) superseded any lan-
guage to the contrary in its previous opinions.' 2 Moreover, the conspicuous
absence of an analysis under the previously applied two-pronged test of similar-
ity and proximity in time 13 intimated that the court interpreted its adoption of
the inclusionary approach as obviating the need to prove either of these previ-
ously required independent safeguards. 14
This Note begins with a brief discussion of the evidence presented at the
trial in Coffey and the court's rationale for upholding its introduction on appeal.
The Note then outlines two lines of state precedent relating to the court's opin-
ion in Coffey: cases delineating the general standard for admissibility of un-
charged misconduct evidence and cases applying this general standard in
situations involving evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct, similar to that in
Coffey. The Note next analyzes two significant aspects of the court's decision.
First, the Note discusses the propriety of the court's express adoption of a rule of
inclusion for uncharged misconduct evidence and contends that the Coffey
court's adoption of this approach is justified by the concomitant intent of the
North Carolina General Assembly. Second, the Note analyzes the court's appli-
cation of this approach to the present case and its apparent abandonment of the
previously applied two-pronged test of similarity and proximity in time. The
Note asserts that the Coffey'court erroneously discarded these important safe-
guards. Specifically, it allowed the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence
for the sole purpose of proving that the defendant was guilty of the charged
offense because he had acted in in accordance with such behavior in the past,
precisely the purpose rule 404(b) prohibits. The Note concludes that only the
North Carolina General Assembly has the authority to restore the common-law
presumption against admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. The Note,
however, recommends that the court restore the previously required two-
pronged test for admission of similar uncharged misconduct evidence.
On July 19, 1979, the beaten and asphyxiated body of ten-year-old Amanda
Ray was found near a lake in Mecklenberg County, North Carolina.' 5 Eight
years later the State indicted the defendant for the first degree murder of the
9. 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48 (1990).
10. Id. at 280-81, 389 S.E.2d at 55-56.
11. Id. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of this two-
pronged standard in previous North Carolina cases.
14. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-81, 389 S.E.2d at 54-56.
15. Id. at 274, 389 S.E.2d at 51.
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child. 16 The prosecution based the first degree murder charge on the theory that
the defendant kidnapped the victim with the intent to commit indecent liberties
and subsequently murdered her to avoid exposure. 17
The prosecution's proof at trial relied exclusively on various types of cir-
cumstantial evidence. The State produced numerous eyewitnesses who testified
that they had seen Amanda talking with a man they identified as the defendant
in the two days prior to the discovery of her body.1 8 In addition to eyewitness
identification, the State offered evidence that fibers found on the victim's body
matched fibers found on several items proven to be in the defendant's possession
around the time of the murder.19
Finally, the State offered the testimony of both Janet Ashe and her pastor,
Reverend James Hall.20 Mrs. Ashe testified about an incident involving the de-
fendant and her three-year-old daughter, Angel. Mrs. Ashe stated that in May
1979 she left Angel with the defendant and, after returning home, learned from
the child that the defendant had masturbated in front of her.21 Both Janet Ashe
and her pastor testified that, when confronted, the defendant admitted to mas-
turbating in front of the child.22
Based on this circumstantial evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of
first degree murder and, following the jury's recommendation, the trial court
entered a death sentence.23 On direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, the defendant raised numerous assignments of error from both the trial
and sentencing proceedings. 24 The court rejected all of the defendant's objec-
tions arising from the trial and conviction phase, but remanded for a new sen-
tencing proceeding because of prejudicial errors that occurred during that
phase.
25
16. Id. at 274, 389 S.E.2d at 52.
17. Id. at 280, 389 S.E.2d at 55.
18. Id. at 274-75, 389 S.E.2d at 52. More specifically, several eyewitnesses testified that they
saw the victim fishing on a lake with the defendant on July 18, 1979, the day before Amanda's body
was discovered near the same lake. Id. at 275, 389 S.E.2d at 52. Several of the witnesses also saw
the defendant in a white van at both the lake and Amanda's apartment complex. Id. at 274-75, 389
S.E.2d at 52.
19. The State introduced fibers taken from a sofa and van which belonged to the defendant at
the time of the murder. Id. at 276, 389 S.E.2d at 53. Both the defendant and his ex-wife confirmed
that the defendant owned a white and blue van in 1979. Id. at 276-77, 389 S.E.2d at 53. Apparently,
the sofa had not been cleaned in approximately ten years; thus the police were able to obtain hair
fibers from a dog, since deceased but admittedly owned by the defendant. Id. An expert in trace
evidence testified that dog hairs found in the sofa matched those found on the victim's body and in
the defendant's van. Id. The expert also stated that fibers from the carpet in the defendant's van
matched fibers found on Amanda's body. Id.
20, Id. at 277-78, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
21. Id.
22. Id. In a voir dire hearing prior to the admission of this evidence, the court concluded that
the incident involving Angel Ashe was admissible but excluded evidence of two other incidents
where the defendant had taken indecent liberties with other young girls. Id. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 55.
The court ruled that the cumulative effect of this evidence would be more prejudicial than probative
under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Id.
23. Id. at 274, 389 S.E.2d at 51.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court reversed the death sentence based on a failure to follow procedures outlined
in § 15A-2000(c)(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id. at 296, 389 S.E.2d at 64.65, This
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The court's rationale for upholding the admission of the testimony involv-
ing the incident with Angel Ashe is especially significant. The court rejected the
defendant's contention that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts falls under
a general rule of exclusion, subject only to certain exceptions. 26 Instead, the
court embraced the position that the adoption of North Carolina Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) manifested a clear legislative intent on the part of the North Caro-
lina General Assembly to codify a general rule of inclusion.27 Under this
standard of inclusion, the court stated, such uncharged misconduct evidence
generally is admitted, "subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its
only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposi-
tion to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged." 28 The court
added that its prior decisions have been "markedly liberal" in admitting evi-
dence of prior sex offenses of an "unnatural" character, such as in the present
case.
29
Under this general standard of inclusion, the court ruled that the trial court
properly admitted evidence of the Angel Ashe episode because its admission
satisfied two distinct purposes specifically enumerated in rule 404(b). 30 First,
the court ruled that the incident with Angel Ashe could provide a motive for
Amanda's murder.3 1 In addition, the court held that the lower court properly
admitted this evidence to prove specific intent, a necessary element of the under-
lying felony of kidnapping.32 Finally, the court ruled that in admitting the evi-
dence the trial court did not abuse its discretion under North Carolina Rule of
Evidence 403.33
statute requires that the foreman return a signed writing on behalf of the jury finding that mitigating
circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors before imposing the death pen-
alty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(3) (1988). Because the trial court did not follow this proce-
dure, the supreme court remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. Coffey, 326 N.C. at
297, 389 S.E.2d at 65.
26. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54 (emphasis in original).
29. Id. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 54-55 (quoting 1 H. BRA1NDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 92 (3d ed. 1988)).
30. The rule lists as proper purposes proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment, or accident. N.C.R. EViD. 404(b) (1986).
This list is identical to that contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) except for the addition of
the word "entrapment." Id. 404(b) commentary.
31. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 280, 389 S.E.2d at 55. This reasoning reflects the prosecution's theory
that the defendant killed the victim to avoid any exposure similar to that which occurred with Angel
Ashe. Id. Although the prosecution was not required to prove a motive, the court held that motive
is always admissible when the act is in question. Id. Consequently, the court ruled that the trial
court properly admitted the evidence for this purpose. Id.
32. Id. at 280-81, 389 S.E.2d at 55-56. The prosecution theorized that the defendant took the
victim with the intent to commit indecent liberties, thereby committing a kidnapping. Id. at 281,
389 S.E.2d at 55-56. The court agreed that the episode involving Angel Ashe tended to prove the
necessary specific intent and ruled that the evidence was admitted properly on this theory as well.
Id.
33. Id. at 281, 389 S.E.2d at 56. The court stated that under rule 403 the trial judge has wide
discretion to determine if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed substantially by the
danger of undue prejudice to the defendant. See N.C.R. EVID. 403. The court held that the trial
court had remained within the bounds of its discretion on this issue. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 281, 389
S.E.2d at 56.
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In addressing the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence, the
North Carolina Supreme Court confronted a number of its previous decisions,
decided both before and after the enactment of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence, which took effect on July 1, 1984. 34 The cases decided after the adop-
tion of rule 404(b) retain some of the pre-rule safeguards, but also show a
marked trend toward the admission of "other crimes evidence." 35 This trend
toward admissibility is particularly prominent in the area of prior sexual acts,
especially those of an "unusual" or "unnatural" character. 36
Before the adoption of rule 404(b) and to some extent even after its adop-
tion, the seminal case concerning other crimes evidence in North Carolina was
State v. McClain.37 In McClain, a jury convicted the defendant of prostitution.
The defendant appealed and excepted to the admission of evidence that she sur-
reptitiously stole $135 from her client subsequent to the alleged prostitution. 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting
the evidence. The court announced that a general rule of exclusion "subject to
certain well recognized exceptions" governed admission of evidence of un-
charged offenses. 39 Applying this standard, the McClain court excluded evi-
dence relating to the defendant's uncharged larceny because it did not fall within
one of the listed exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.40 Thus, under Mc-
Clain, to admit evidence of other uncharged crimes the state had to prove that
the evidence satisfied one of the finite number of well-recognized exceptions.
The McClain court expounded several strong justifications for the general
rule of exclusion:
"the dangerous tendency and misleading probative force of this class of
evidence require that its admission should be subjected by the courts to
rigid scrutiny. Whether the requisite degree of relevancy exists is a
judicial question to be resolved in the light of the consideration that
the inevitable tendency of such evidence is to raise a legally spurious
presumption of guilt in the minds of the jurors. Hence, if the court
does not clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous crimi-
nal transaction and the crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy, the
accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence
should be rejected." '4 1
34. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws
666, 668-69 (codified at N.C.R. EVID. 404(b)).
35. Other crimes evidence is a term of art used to refer to proffered evidence relating to an act
that is independent of the charged crime. This is the type of evidence at issue in rule 404(b) cases
such as Coffey.
36. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
37. 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
38. Id. at 172-73, 81 S.E.2d at 365.
39. Id. at 174, 81 S.E.2d at 366. The Court then delineated eight exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. Compare id. with N.C.R. EVID. 404(b) (1986) (the exceptions provided in McClain are ex-
tremely similar to those specifically enumerated in rule 404(b)).
40. McClain, 240 N.C. at 177, 81 S.E.2d at 368. The court subsequently held that admission of
such evidence would be prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id.
41. Id. at 177, 81 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 221, 4 S.E.2d 1, 4
(1939)); see also id. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 356-66 (the court also discusses the reasons for an exclu-
sionary rule); State v. Shane, 304 N.C 643, 654,285 S.E.2d 813, 820 (1982) ("[Flundamental fairness
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On July 1, 1984, the North Carolina Rules of Evidence took effect,42 with
rule 404(b) specifically addressing the admissibility of uncharged misconduct ev-
idence.4 3 Originally, the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the new
rule to be consistent with prior North Carolina practice.44 Despite this avowed
consistency, North Carolina courts' interpretation of the general standard under
rule 404(b) has been subtly, yet significantly, modified from the pre-rule stan-
dard to one allowing greater admissibility.
For example, in State v. Morgan,45 an early case interpreting the new rule,
the court stated that uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible so long as it is
offered for some purpose other than to show action in conformity. 46 In Morgan
the defendant allegedly came out of his place of business and shot the victim.47
At trial, the State proffered evidence that the defendant had pointed a gun at an
unrelated party three months earlier to disprove his claim of self-defense. 48 The
court held that offering evidence of previous violent behavior to prove that the
defendant was the aggressor in the affray was exactly the type of propensity
evidence excluded by rule 404(b). 49 Thus, under Morgan, the court's announced
standard appears to be more lenient than under McClain because it focuses not
on the exclusion of evidence but instead on the admission of evidence assuming
the prosecution can prove the existence of any proper purpose.5 0 The Morgan
court's application of this standard to the facts of the case, however, retains the
same protections against propensity evidence present in pre-rule cases. 51
In a case decided in the same year as Morgan, the court took an even
broader reading of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence under
rule 404(b). In State v. Weaver,5 2 the court asserted that under both rule 404(b)
and previously under McClain, "the purposes for which evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible is not limited to those enumerated either in
requires giving defendant the benefit of the doubt and excluding the evidence. [Or, as it is more
descriptively said in the game of baseball, the tie must go to the runner]." (brackets in original)).
42. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws
666, 668-69 (codified at N.C.R. EVID. 404(b)).
43. Rule 404(b) reads:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidene of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not ad-
missible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrap-
ment or accident.
N.C.R. EvID. 404(b).
44. State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1986). In fact, the commentary to
rule 404(b) indicates this same point. See N.C.R. EVID. 404(b) commentary.
45. 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986).
46. Id. at 636, 340 S.E.2d at 91.
47. Id. at 629, 340 S.E.2d at 86. Apparently this incident evolved from a dispute between the
defendant and the victim over closing down his business. Id.
48. Id. at 637-38, 340 S.E.2d at 91-92.
49. Id. at 638, 340 S.E.2d at 92.
50. Id. at 635-40, 340 S.E.2d at 90-93.
51. See id. at 637-38, 340 S.E.2d at 91-92.
52. 318 N.C. 400, 348 S.E.2d 791 (1986). The State charged the defendant with felonious
breaking and entering and larceny of a chain saw and socket set. Id. at 400, 348 S.E.2d at 792.
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the rule or in McClain.' 53 The court stated, in even broader language, "[i]n
fact, as a careful reading of rule 404(b) clearly shows, evidence of other offenses
is admissible so long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the character
of the accused." 54 Under this expansive standard, the court found evidence of
the defendant's prior dealings with a government witness admissible to show a
common plan or scheme.5 5 Thus, in both its language and its application, the
Weaver court significantly relaxed the general admissibility standard for un-
charged misconduct evidence.
In addition to cases delineating the general admissibility standard, numer-
ous North Carolina cases have addressed the admissibility of "other crimes"
evidence in the specific context of sexual misconduct. These cases, also decided
before and after the adoption of rule 404(b), clearly show that the court's ap-
proach to admitting evidence of prior sex acts has been markedly different from
its approach when evaluating cases involving all other crimes. The court stated
in a pre-rule case: "Our Court has been very liberal in admitting evidence of
similar sex crimes in construing the exceptions to the general rule [of exclu-
sion]." '5 6 Even in cases of prior sex acts, however, the court has required that
the evidence meet certain safeguards in order to protect the defendant's right to
a fundamentally fair trial.
In a pre-rule case in this specific context, State v. Shane,5 7 the State
charged a police officer with first degree sexual offense for allegedly using his
position to gain sexual favors from employees of a massage parlor.58 The trial
court admitted testimony from the defendant's former employer about a similar
but independent incident.5 9 Despite the supreme court's finding that a "striking
similarity" existed between the two episodes, it held that the period of time
elapsing between the two events, approximately one year, "substantially negated
the plausibility of the existence of an ongoing and continuous plan to engage
persistently in such deviant activities." 6 Consequently, the court held that the
erroneous and prejudicial admission of such evidence required a new trial.61
53. Id. at 402-03, 348 S.E.2d at 793. This quotation is at variance with the clear holding of
McClain. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
54. Weaver, 318 N.C. at 403, 348 S.E.2d at 794 (citing 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 91 (1982)).
55. Id. at 404, 348 S.E.2d at 793-94. A defense witness testified that he, and not the defendant,
had stolen and sold the tools. Id. at 402, 348 S.E.2d at 793. The court allowed admission of the
defendant's prior dealings with the State's witness to disprove the claim of the defense witness. Id. at
403-04, 348 S.E.2d at 793-94.
56. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 423, 241 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1978). In Greene, the court ruled
that two cases of assault and rape had been properly consolidated and that testimony of the com-
plaining witness in one case was admitted properly as to the other case under both the identity and
common plan exceptions. Id.
57. 304 N.C. 643, 285 S.E.2d 813, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1982).
58. Id. at 644-46, 285 S.E.2d at 815.
59. Id. at 652, 285 S.E.2d at 819. This other incident, like the one charged, involved the de.
fendant's use of his position of authority to coerce the victim to engage in oral sex. Id.
60. Id. at 655-56, 285 S.E.2d at 820-21. The State had argued that this evidence should be
admitted under the common plan or scheme purpose. Id. at 653-54, 285 S.E.2d at 820.
61. Id. at 656-57, 285 S.E.2d at 821-22.
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Thus, in Shane, the court recognized the first essential requirement in admitting
sexual misconduct evidence-proximity in time to the charged crime.
Another pre-rule case involving admission of uncharged sexual crimes illus-
trates a second requirement for admitting such evidence. In State v. Moore,62
the trial court, during the defendant's trial for first degree sexual offense, admit-
ted the testimony of a victim of a separate uncharged rape, who identified the
defendant as her assailant.63 The trial court admitted the evidence of the previ-
ous sexual offense under the theory that it helped identify the perpetrator of the
charged crime-a recognized exception to the general rule of exclusion." The
Moore court, however, ruled that the testimony relating to the uncharged crime
should have been excluded because of the limited similarities between the two
crimes.65 The court noted that "[t]o allow the admission of evidence of other
crimes without such a showing of similarities would defeat the purpose of the
general rule of exclusion."'66
Thus, prior to the adoption of rule 404(b), the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized, in separate cases, the existence of two important constraints
on the admissibility of sexual misconduct: proximity in time and similarity.
The court initially reaffirmed the continued existence of these requirements after
the adoption of rule 404(b) in State v. Scott.67 In Scott, a jury convicted the
defendant of a first degree sexual offense perpetrated on his three and four-year-
old nieces. 68 The trial court admitted testimony that eight years previously,
when the defendant was only thirteen, he had forced his sister to have sexual
intercourse with him at knife-point.69
In analyzing the propriety of admitting such evidence, the court recognized
that "no rule exists generally permitting evidence of a defendant's 'unnatural
disposition.' "70 Nevertheless, the court observed that it had made "exceptions
under McClain or Rule 404(b) if the incidents... [were] sufficiently similar and
not too remote in time so as to be more probative than prejudicial under the
Rule 403 balancing test."'71 Applying this standard, the court ruled that the
62. 309 N.C. 102, 305 S.E.2d 542 (1983).
63. Id. at 103, 305 S.E.2d at 542-43.
64. Id. at 106, 305 S.E.2d at 544.
65. Id. at 108, 305 S.E.2d at 545-46. The court found that certain similarities did exist; specifi-
cally, the assailant in both instances had used a knife, both involved oral sex, and both occurred in
Greensboro, North Carolina, within a two month period. Id. at 107, 305 S.E.2d at 545. The court,
however, found that differences between the two-primarily the contrast between the relatively non-
threatening demeanor of the assailant in this case and the violent disposition of the assailant in the
first assault-outweighed any similarities that might have existed. Id. Justice Meyer wrote a scath-
ing dissent asserting that the appellate court should have focused upon the similarities and not the
differences in evaluating the propriety of admitting the testimonial evidence. Id. at 109-10, 305
S.E.2d at 546-47 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 106-107, 305 S.E.2d at 545. The court found the admission of evidence prejudicial
and granted the defendant a new trial. Id. at 109, 305 S.E.2d at 546.
67. 318 N.C. 237, 347 S.E.2d 414 (1986).
68. Id. at 239, 347 S.E.2d at 415.
69. Id. at 244-45, 347 S.E.2d at 418-19. The trial court had allowed testimony regarding the
incident to be elicited during the cross-examination of the defendant and his sister. Id.
70. Id. at 248, 347 S.E.2d at 420.
71. Id.
1991] EVIDENCE 1611
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
incident with defendant's sister eight years ago was too remote in time and dis-
similar from the charged crime to be admitted under any theory recognized by
the court.72
In other cases decided after the adoption of rule 404(b), however, the court
has repeatedly held admissible under this two-pronged standard of proximity in
time and similarity evidence of "unnatural" prior sex acts. The court frequently
admits evidence of uncharged sexual wrongs where a defendant has sexually
abused members of his family on various independent occasions.73 For example,
in State v. DeLeonardo,74 the defendant faced charges of sexually molesting his
sons.75 The trial court, however, admitted evidence that the defendant also had
sexually abused his three-year-old daughter.76 Without reservation, the
supreme court held that the evidence relating to defendant's daughter was ad-
missible to establish a common plan or scheme on the part of the defendant to
sexually abuse his children.77
Thus the court has been more liberal in allowing evidence of uncharged
sexual misconduct than it has been concerning evidence of other uncharged
crimes. The court, however, has placed some restraint on the admissibility of
this type of evidence by employing consistently the two-pronged standard re-
quiring sufficient similarity and proximity in time to the charged act. The deci-
sions of the North Carolina Supreme Court reflect a general adherence to these
procedural safeguards in evaluating evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct.
The court's decision in Coffey is significant for two distinct but related rea-
sons. First, the Coffey court expressly adopted the inclusionary approach to
72. Id. The court granted the defendant a new trial as a result of the erroneous and prejudicial
admission of this evidence. Id.
73. See, eg., State v. Miller, 321 N.C. 445, 454, 364 S.E.2d 387, 392 (1988); State v. Boyd, 321
N.C. 574, 577-78, 364 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1988); State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 771-72, 340
S.E.2d 350, 357 (1986).
74. 315 N.C. 762, 340 S.E.2d 350 (1986).
75. Id. at 763, 340 S.E.2d at 352.
76. Id. at 767, 340 S.E.2d at 354-55.
77. Id. at 770-71, 340 S.E.2d at 356-57. In a similar case, the court affirmed the admission of
evidence, pursuant to the same common-plan exception, that the defendant had sexually abused the
victim, his son, the day after the charged incident. State v. Miller, 321 N.C. 445, 454, 364 S.E.2d
387, 392 (1988).
On the same day as the Miller decision, the court handed down another case approving the
admission of evidence of uncharged sex crimes with another member of the defendant's family. State
v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 364 S.E.2d 118 (1988). In Boyd, the defendant was convicted of the rape of
his thirteen-year-old step-daughter. Id. at 575-76, 364 S.E.2d at 118-19. The trial court admitted
testimony that within a year of the charged rape, the defendant's wife had discovered the defendant
in the step-daughter's bed with an eight-year-old female cousin. Id. at 576, 364 S.E.2d at 119. Ap-
plying the two-pronged standard announced in Scott, the Boyd court found the incident "sufficiently
similar to the act charged and not too remote in time" so as to be properly admitted. Id. at 578, 364
S.E.2d at 120.
In a case decided a few months after Boyd, the court again applied this standard to uphold the
admission of similar evidence in State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 370 S.E.2d 359 (1988). In Rosier, the
defendant faced charges of first degree sexual offense for forcing an unrelated seven-year-old to have
anal intercourse. Id. at 827, 370 S.E.2d at 360. The court held that testimony regarding the defend-
ant's prior conviction for fondling other young children only three months prior to the charged
offense was similar and not too remote in time, Id. at 828-29, 370 S.E.2d at 360-61. Accordingly,
the court ruled that the evidence was properly admitted because it established a common scheme or
plan. Id.
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uncharged misconduct evidence under rule 404(b). Although the court at-
tempted to de-emphasize the importance of this decision by stating that it was
merely announcing a principle recognized by its former cases, in fact the court's
adoption of a general inclusionary approach is an important transformation of
court policy.78 Second, the Coffey decision is significant because the court inex-
plicably abandoned the two-pronged test it previously employed to determine
the admissibility of uncharged sexual misconduct evidence.
The exclusionary approach to uncharged misconduct generally prohibits
the admission of evidence of other crimes subject only to a finite number of well-
recognized exceptions. 7 9 Under this traditional doctrine, evidence that does not
fit within one of the previously acknowledged "pigeonhole[s]" is automatically
excluded.80 In contrast, the inclusionary approach allows the admission of
other crimes evidence unless its only probative value is to show the accused's
propensity to commit the charged crime. In other words, admissibility of such
evidence is not limited to one of the specifically enumerated exceptions, but can
be introduced if it satisfies any valid purpose other than to illustrate the defend-
ant's propensity to commit crimes.8 1
To evaluate the Coffey court's express adoption of the inclusionary ap-
proach and equally explicit rejection of the exclusionary approach, two in-
dependent factors must be examined: the original intent of the North Carolina
78. For a discussion of the propriety of the Coffey court's depiction of its precedent as unques-
tionably establishing a rule of inclusion under rule 404(b), see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
79. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal
Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. Rv. 713, 713 (1981) [hereinafter Reed, Trial by Propensity].
80. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468. The exclusionary approach is founded on nothing less
than the nature of the Anglo-American accusatorial system, as opposed to the European inquisitorial
system. Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 713. In an accusatorial system, the state has the
burden of proving that a criminal defendant committed some act prohibited by law. In juxtaposi-
tion, the inquisitorial system assumes the accused committed a crime and requires him to prove his
innocence. Id. More specifically, the emergence of the propensity rule can be linked to a seven-
teenth-century reaction against the use of the Star Chamber during the Tudor and Stuart Regimes.
The Star Chamber was a royal court designed to eliminate political and religious rivals of the monar-
chy through treason trials. Id. at 716-17.
The exclusionary approach was the traditional view in American jurisdictions, with a majority
of the states subscribing to it in the early twentieth century. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar
Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988, 1036 n.221 (1938). The North Carolina Supreme
Court traditionally followed this approach, as indicated by the court's decision in State v. McClain,
240 N.C. 171, 173, 81 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1954). For a discussion of the McClain decision, see supra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text. The exclusionary approach remained in force in a majority of
states at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Reed, The Development of the
Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 303-04 (1982) [here-
inafter Reed, Federal Causes].
81. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468. This approach originated in Dean Wigmore's charac-
ter rule. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 216 (1904); see Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 736-
37. Dean Wigmore asserted that evidence of an accused's character was highly probative and that
courts were too cautious in excluding this evidence to protect a criminal defendant. As a result of
this view, Wigmore proposed instead that character evidence should be excluded only when it was
offered solely to establish an accused's propensity to criminal activity--essentially the modem inclu-
sionary rule. J. WIGMORE, § 216; see also Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 736-37 (ex-
plaining Dean Wigmore's views on the subject).
This inclusionary approach prevailed in a minority of federal jurisdictions before the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Reed, Federal Causes, supra note 80, at 303-04; Reed, Admis-
sion of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of The Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L.
REv. 113, 113-14 (1984) [hereinafter Reed, After Adoption].
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General Assembly in adopting rule 404(b) and, conversely, the justifications typ-
ically given by many state courts for retaining the exclusionary rule. Because
North Carolina rule 404(b) is modeled after its counterpart in the federal
rules,8 2 determining congressional intent is a useful starting point for any at-
tempt to determine the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly in enact-
ing its corresponding state version. The congressional history of the House 83
and Senate, 84 as well as the explanations set forth in the advisory committee's
note85 to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), indicate that Congress intended to
place more emphasis on the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. As
a result, many commentators concluded that Congress intended to adopt an in-
clusionary approach in enacting federal rule 404(b). 86
82. See N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary (1986).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7081;
The second sentence of Rule 404(b) as submitted to the Congress began with the words
"This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered." The Committee amended
this language to read "It may, however, be admissible", the words used in the 1971 Advi-
sory Committee draft, on the ground that this formulation properly placed greater emphasis
on admissibility than did the final Court version.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7071;
[Rule 404(b)] provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove character but may be admissible for other specified purposes such as proof of
motive.
Although your committee sees no necessity in amending the rule itself, it anticipates
that the use of the discretionary word "may" with respect to the admissibility of evidence
of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial
judge. Rather, it is anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the
trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e.
prejudice, confusion or waste of time.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note:
Subdivision (b) deals with a specialized but important application of the general rule
excluding circumstantial use of character evidence. Consistently [sic] with that rule, evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character as a basis for
suggesting the inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it.
However, the evidence may be offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, and so on, which does not fall within the prohibition. In this situation the rule does
not require that the evidence be excluded. No mechanical solution is offered. The determi-
nation must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value
of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appro-
priate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.
Id.
86. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1484; Reed, AfterAdoption, supra note 81, at 156,
Professor Imwinkelried conducted an extensive survey of the available legislative history sur-
rounding the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, he questioned whether rule
404(b) retained the common-law allocation of burden to the proponent of evidence or, alternatively,
whether the rule switched the burden to the defendant by incorporating the rule 403 balancing test.
Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1479-80. The rule 403 balancing test places the burden of excluding
evidence on the defendant by requiring that relevant evidence should be admitted unless the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. FED. R. EVMD. 403. Professor Im-
winkelried concluded that Congress intended to incorporate the rule 403 balancing test, which in
effect adopts an inclusionary approach by allocating the burden of excluding evidence to the defend-
ant. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1479-80. His conclusion was based on three main argu-
ments.
First, he asserted that rule 403 was incorporated into all rules contained within the federal rules
1614 [Vol. 69
EVIDENCE
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
issue,87 the overwhelming majority of federal circuits have interpreted rule
404(b) as adopting an inclusionary approach.88 These courts stressed the signifi-
cance of the placement of the words "such as" preceding the list of exceptions,
that did not expressly preclude its application. Because rule 404(b) does not exclude the rule 403
balancing test, he deduced that the test is included. Id. at 1480.
Second, Imwinkelried rejected the partial incorporation theory, which maintains that rule
404(b) allows a judge to consider the rule 403 factors but preserves the common-law burden. Id. at
1481. Although conceding that this theory is consistent with the literal language of the advisory
committee note, he rejected this notion as contrary to the congressional intent to broaden admissibil-
ity for uncharged misconduct evidence. Id. at 1481-82.
Finally, he rejected the argument that Congress would have made such a sweeping change
explicit in the rule if such a change was truly intended. Id. at 1483. Imwinkelried asserted that
Congress interpreted the language of rule 402, permitting admission of relevant evidence unless
otherwise excluded, as precluding the need for an express repudiation of the common law standard.
Id. at 1483-84.
87. The Supreme Court, however, has addressed the related issue of whether a trial court must
make a preliminary finding that the uncharged misconduct occurred before admitting rule 404(b)
evidence. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). The Court held that the
proponent of 404(b) evidence is not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act
occurred. Id. at 687-89.
Although not directly addressing the issue of which approach Congress intended to adopt in
rule 404(b), the Supreme Court, in two distinct portions of its opinion in Huddleston, gave conflict-
ing indications of its interpretation of this matter. The Court stated: "Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) ... generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely
reflect on the actor's character, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such as
motive, opportunity, or knowledge." Id. at 685 (emphasis added). Although not conclusive, this
language intimates a general rule of exclusion.
In contrast, at the conclusion of its opinion, the Court implied that rule 404(b) incorporates an
inclusionary approach. To allay the fears of the petitioner, the Court observed that even without a
preliminary finding requirement the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence would not be un-
restrained because other protective measures bar introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence. Id. at
691-92. In dicta the Court stated that one such measure is the incorporation of the rule 403 balanc-
ing test into rule 404(b). Id. at 691. This interpretation of rule 404(b), if accepted as binding, would
effectively reverse the common-law presumption of exclusion. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at
1484.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We have construed
Rule 404(b) as being 'a rule of inclusion.' ") (quoting Heath v. Cast, 813 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987)); Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991) ("But
such evidence may be admitted for any other relevant purpose under our 'inclusionary' approach.")
(quoting United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1022
(1989)); United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1990) ("We view Rule 404(b) as a rule
of inclusion .. "); Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Rule 404(b) is a
rule of inclusion, not exclusion .... "); United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 776 (1 lth Cir. 1989)
("The rule [404(b)] is one of inclusion .... "); United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 948
(6th Cir.) ("Thus, we have explained that Rule 404(b) 'is actually a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion .... ') (quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 255 (1989); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir. 1988) ("This Court
has held Rule 404(b) to be an 'inclusionary rule .......") (quoting United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d
83, 85 (4th Cir. 1980)); United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988) ("It is well
settled that the rule [404(b)] is one of inclusion .... ); United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 987 &
n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding congressional intent in enacting rule 404(b) to adopt an inclusionary
approach); United States v. Jordan, 722 F.2d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 1983) (" 'The draftsmen of Rule
404(b) intended it to be construed as one of inclusion, and not exclusion.' ") (quoting United States
v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978)); United States v. Ackal, 706
F.2d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (" 'This test [adopted by the circuit] takes an inclusionary
and not an exclusionary approach.' ") (quoting United States v. King, 703 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 711 F.2d 1054 (1983)). But see United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148,
1153 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Rule 404(b) is a rule of exclusion.").
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and concluded that the list of exceptions is only illustrative, not exhaustive.8 9
Consequently, these courts have held that the federal version of rule 404(b)
adopts an inclusionary approach, rather than one characterized by a general rule
of exclusion with a limited number of enumerated exceptions.9"
The accepted interpretation of the federal rule is important because the
North Carolina General Assembly apparently intended to follow the federal
model. The most authoritative support for this interpretation, besides the al-
most identical language of the two rules, is the commentary following the North
Carolina rule. This commentary repeats verbatim the language contained in the
federal advisory committee's note.9 1 If this was not itself a sufficient indication
of an intent to follow the federal rule, the North Carolina commentary appends
an illuminating sentence: "The list in the last sentence of subdivision (b) is
nonexclusive and the fact that evidence cannot be brought within a category
does not mean that the evidence is inadmissible."192 Thus it appears that, like
Congress, the North Carolina General Assembly's intent in enacting its version
of rule 404(b) was to adopt an inclusionary approach.
Although the legislative intent is relatively clear, there are other important
policy concerns that warrant discussion in analyzing the Coffey court's holding.
State courts have repeatedly expressed these policies in retaining the exclusion-
ary approach despite the adoption of rule 404(b) in their respective jurisdictions.
For example, in the seminal pre-rule case on "other crimes" evidence in North
Carolina, State v. McClain,93 the supreme court delineated several of these im-
portant policy concerns.
First, the McClain court observed that logically the commission of an in-
dependent offense did not, in itself, prove the commission of the charged of-
fense.94 Second, the admission of evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
another heinous crime falsely leads the jury to a belief that he is guilty of the
charged crime and, therefore, effectively strips him of the presumption of inno-
89. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468; see, eg., Cohen, 888 F.2d at 776 ("The list provided by
the rule is not exhaustive. .. ."); Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d at 948 (" '[Tihe list of permissible uses of
evidence of other crimes or acts set forth in Rule 404(b) is neither exhaustive nor conclusive.' ")
(quoting United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922
(1987)); Moore, 732 F.2d at 987 n.31 ("The uses specified in the rule [404(b)] are not meant to be
exhaustive, but merely illustrative."); Jordan, 722 F.2d at 356 ("The rule [404(b)] does not exhaust
the purposes for which evidence of other wrongs or acts may be admitted."); United States v. John-
son, 634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir. 1980) ("The Rule's [404(b)] list is merely illustrative, not exclu-
sive."), cert denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981).
90. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1468.
91. See N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary (1986). For the text ofthe federal advisory commit-
tee's note, see supra note 85.
92. N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary. The sentence following this one, however, seems con-
tradictory: "Subdivision (b) is consistent with North Carolina practice." Standing alone and inter-
preted in light of North Carolina practice up until the adoption of rule 404(b), this sentence might be
interpreted as intending the application of an exclusionary approach, or so the literal language sug-
gests. In light of various other statements to the contrary in the commentary, however, this sentence
is probably best viewed as an anomaly or legislative misunderstanding of the current state of the law
in North Carolina prior to adoption.
93. 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954). For a discussion of the historical significance of Mc-
Clain, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
94. McClain, 240 N.C. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 365.
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cence.95 Finally, introduction of this type of evidence unnecessarily diverts the
attention of the jury away from the point in issue and compels the defendant to
meet accusations for which he was not charged.96
Numerous empirical studies reinforce the underlying purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule by confirming that admission of uncharged misconduct evidence
has a significant impact on juries. For example, the Chicago Jury Project9 7 de-
termined that after the proponent disclosed uncharged misconduct evidence, ju-
ries employed a "different... calculus of probabilities" when determining the
guilt or innocence of an accused. 98 Specifically, the study documented that con-
viction rates were significantly greater after such disclosure.99 Furthermore, in a
study conducted on behalf of the National Law and Social Science Founda-
tion,1°° researchers concluded that potential jurors were in substantial agree-
ment in ranking any immoral acts by the defendant as one of the most
prejudicial types of evidence. 10 1 The significance of this finding is augmented
because the potential jurors exhibited virtually no common evaluations regard-
ing the degree of prejudice for other types of evidence. 102
The inclusionary approach adopted by the Coffey court, however, discards
these important arguments against relaxed admissibility of other crimes
evidence. A survey of state court decisions on this issue decided under statutes
similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) discloses a striking disparity of inter-
pretation when compared to the rulings of the federal courts. 10 3 To date, thirty-
four states have enacted an uncharged misconduct rule modeled after Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b).104 Thirty of these states have adopted statutes that are
either verbatim copies of the federal rule or reflect only minor technical
changes.105 Of these states, sixteen have retained the exclusionary approach,10 6
95. Id. at 174, 81 S.E.2d at 366.
96. Id.
97. This title refers to an extensive, exhaustive study of the American jury system conducted at
the University of Chicago Law School. This project attempted to combine the research of attorneys
and social scientists in studying various aspects of the jury system. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY at v (1966).
98. Id. at 179.
99. Id. at 178-79.
100. This study focused on the effects that different aspects of the legal system have on modeling
jury behavior. Professors from the Psychology Department and the School of Law at the University
of New Mexico analyzed the aspect of the study dealing with the prejudicial effect of certain evi-
dence. Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can
Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 1147, 1147.
101. Id. at 1162.
102. Id. at 1163.
103. For a discussion of the federal circuit courts' almost unanimous interpretation of the federal
version of rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
104. See 1 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
STATES ch. 14: Rule 404, at 11-24 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (listing the state statutes).
The states adopting a rule modeled after the federal rule include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1-24.
105. See id. Of the states listed in note 104 supra, all except Florida, Louisiana, Maine, and
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six have expressly adopted the inclusionary approach, 10 7 and eight states either
have not addressed the issue or have reached inconclusive results. 10 8
The discrepancy between federal and state court interpretations of rule
404(b) stems primarily from most state courts' refusal to disregard the policies
underlying the exclusionary rule. These state courts looked primarily to the
purposes underlying the exclusionary rule as a basis for their retention of it.109
Consequently, they implicitly have chosen to disregard the apparent intent of
the legislators to adopt an inclusionary rule 10 in favor of the policies behind the
exclusionary rule.
The Coffey court could have followed these state courts and chosen to ig-
nore the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly in favor of the policies
governing its case law prior to adoption of rule 404(b). A judicial decision fol-
lowing this route, however, arguably presents a serious danger to the whole
structure of the rules of evidence because it ignores the intent of the legislature
in favor of judge-made rules. 1" Rule 402 allows admission of evidence unless it
is expressly prohibited by another rule, the United States or North Carolina
Constitutions, or other legislative acts. 112 Rule 402's fundamental premise-all
Tennessee have adopted a rule which essentially codifies Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in their
respective states. See id.
106. See, eg., Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Alaska 1980); Soper v. State, 731 P.2d
587, 589-90 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 216-18, 700 P.2d 1312, 1316.18
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985); State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 278, 698 P.2d 335,
340 (1985); People v. Devine, 168 Mich. App. 56, 58, 423 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1988); Elmore v. State,
510 So. 2d 127, 130 (Miss. 1987); State v. Fitzgerald, 238 Mont. 261, 265, 776 P.2d 1222, 1225
(1989); Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 567, 665 P.2d 798, 801 (1983); State v. Ferguson, 391 N.W.2d
172, 174-75 (N.D. 1986); State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St. 3d 277, 281-82, 533 N.E.2d 682, 689-90
(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989); Little v. State, 725 P.2d 606, 607 (Olda. Crim. App.
1986); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788, 790-91 (S.D. 1978) (en bane), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193 (S.D. 1985); Turner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 668, 671-72 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366,
380-82, 534 A.2d 184, 193 (1987); State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208, 212 (W. Va. 1986), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Edward, 398 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1990); Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974
(Wyo. 1989).
107. See eg., Sullivan v. State, 289 Ark. 323, 328, 711 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1986); Getz v. State,
538 A.2d 726, 730-31 (Del. 1988); State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Iowa 1988); State v.
Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 532, 503 A.2d 809, 813 (1985); Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54;
State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 544, 725 P.2d 312, 317-18 (1986).
In addition, two other states with substantially modified versions of rule 404(b) have also
adopted an inclusionary approach. See Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 358 (Fla. 1988); State v.
DeLong, 505 A.2d 803, 805-06 (Me. 1986).
108. These states include Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
109. See, ag., Houghton, 272 N.W.2d at 790 (South Dakota); Turner, 754 S.W.2d at 671-72
(Texas).
110. Because these decisions are from states with statutes almost identical to the federal rule, it is
logical that the intent of the adopters from these states was to follow Congress' intent to adopt an
inclusionary rule. For a discussion of congressional intent in enacting rule 404(b), see supra notes
83-86 and accompanying text.
111. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1491-95.
112. The North Carolina version of Rule 402 reads: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of North Caro-
lina, by an Act of Congress, by an Act of the General Assembly, or by these rules. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible." N.C.R. EvID. 402 (1986).
The commentary following the rule adds: "This rule is identical to Fed. R. Evid. 402 except that
the phrases 'by the Constitution of North Carolina' and 'by Act of the General Assembly' were
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relevant evidence should be admitted unless expressly excluded by legislative
act-is the basis of the federal rules and is designed to eliminate the existence of
judge-made rules of evidence. 113 Interpreting rule 404(b) as exclusionary, con-
trary to its clear language, is in essence a judicial decision which subverts the
comprehensive codification effort of the rules. 114 Therefore, ignoring legislative
intent and preferring the common-law purposes behind the exclusionary ap-
proach could precipitate continuous undermining of the foundational principle
behind the rules of evidence. 115
Thus, although strong support exists in both empirical studies and state
case law for the continued application of the exclusionary approach to un-
charged misconduct evidence, following these policy concerns could have detri-
mental effects on the integrity of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The
North Carolina General Assembly expressed a relatively clear intent to adopt an
inclusionary approach when it enacted North Carolina Rule of Evidence
404(b). 116 Given the intent of the General Assembly and the limited role of the
courts, the Coffey court's adoption of an inclusionary approach is wholly justi-
fied. Furthermore, because subverting the intent of the General Assembly could
have potentially pernicious effects on the integrity and success of the entire
structure of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the Coffey court cannot be
faulted for adopting an inclusionary approach, despite the strong policies sup-
porting the exclusionary rule. 117
A second significant aspect of the Coffey decision is more dubious, however.
The North Carolina Supreme Court consistently has held, both before and after
the adoption of rule 404(b), that evidence of prior sexual misconduct must sat-
isfy a two-pronged test of substantial similarity and proximity in time to the
charged crime.' 18 For example, in State v. Boyd'1 9 the court cited the broad
admissibility standard enunciated in post-rule cases that relate to sexual miscon-
duct evidence.1 20 In the next sentence, however, the court stated: "Neverthe-
less, the ultimate test for determining whether such [uncharged misconduct]
evidence is admissible is whether the incidents are sufficiently similar and not so
remote in time as to be more probative than prejudicial under the balancing test
of ... Rule 403. '"121 Thus, as Boyd illustrates, the court previously did not
added and the phrase 'by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity' was deleted." Id. 402 commentary.
113. 22 C. WRIGlrr & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5199, at 220-23.
114. See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1493-94.
115. See id. at 1494-95. Professor Imwinkelried discusses other instances where courts have
ignored the framers' intent in adopting a rule and its deleterious effect on the corresponding eviden-
tiary code. Id. at 1494-96.
116. N.C.R. EvID. 404(b) commentary.
117. For a discussion of the appropriate legislative response in light of this empirical support for
the exclusionary rule, see infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
118. See, eg., State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 828-29, 370 S.E.2d 359, 360-61 (1988); State v.
Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1988); State v. Scott, 318 N.C. 237, 248, 347 S.E.2d
414, 420 (1986). For a discussion of North Carolina cases applying this rule, see supra notes 57-77
and accompanying text.
119. 321 N.C. 574, 364 S.E.2d 118 (1988). For a discussion of Boyd, see supra note 77.
120. Boyd, 321 N.C. at 577, 364 S.E.2d at 119.
121. Id.
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interpret the adoption of a broad admissibility standard as superseding the appli-
cation of this independent two-pronged test.122
Furthermore, the Boyd court expressly acknowledged the grave risks inher-
ent in the adoption of a broad admissibility standard for uncharged misconduct
evidence. The court stated: "We are not unmindful of the danger of allowing
Rule 404(b) exceptions to become so pervasive that they swallow the rule, a
danger vigorously argued in defendant's brief. We, however, do not find that its
application to the facts of this case encourages that danger."123
This express concern for the untrammeled admission of other crime evi-
dence is entirely lacking from the court's decision in Coffey. In fact, an analysis
under the two-pronged test is conspicuously absent from the court's opinion.124
The court mentioned the defendant's contention that the incident with Angel
Ash e was not similar to the charged murder.125 It did not, however, employ the
two-pronged test of similarity and proximity in time to reject this argument;
instead, the court implied that the broad admissibility standard under rule
404(b) disposed of the defendant's contention. 126 The court's analysis intimates
that it believed the adoption of a broad inclusionary approach under rule 404(b)
supersedes any previously recognized requirements that the proponent of the
other crimes evidence prove its similarity and timeliness. 127 This reasoning is a
dramatic departure from the analysis employed by the court just two years pre-
viously in Boyd.128
It is possible that the Coffey court implicitly considered the two-pronged
standard in making its analysis. The court concluded that evidence of the Angel
Ashe episode satisfied both the motive and specific intent purposes under rule
404(b). 29 The court found this evidence relevant to prove the intent and motive
for the underlying felony of kidnapping for the purpose of committing indecent
liberties. 130 Presumably, the court implicitly concluded that the incident involv-
ing Angel Ashe was similar to the State's contention that the defendant had
taken indecent liberties with the victim.
The fallacy of this argument, however, is patent: the State had no extrinsic
122. In fact, the Boyd court explicitly found that evidence of the defendant's prior acts with a
related victim fell squarely within this two-pronged test. Id. at 578, 364 S.E.2d at 120.
123. Id. This quotation also calls into question the Coffey court's depiction of its post.rule cases
as effectively adopting an inclusionary approach. This language suggests that the court is still fol-
lowing a general standard of exclusion. The reference to "exceptions swallowing up the rule" is
more consistent with an exclusionary than an inclusionary approach. The standard announced in
State v. Weaver, two years prior to Boyd, however, supports the court's view. See State v. Weaver,
318 N.C. 400, 402-03, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986). Thus, it is probably most accurate to describe the
court's approach to rule 404(b) prior to Coffey as inconclusive or perhaps inconsistent. This incon-
sistency only reinforces the view that the Coffey court's express adoption of the inclusionary rule is
an extremely significant ruling, not the mere reaffirmance of prior case law, as the court asserts. See
Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
124. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-81, 389 S.E.2d at 54-56.
125. Id. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54.
126. See id. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54-55.
127. See id.
128. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
129. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 280-81, 389 S.E.2d at 55-56.
'130. Id.
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evidence that Coffey took any indecent liberties with Amanda Ray. The only
connection between the completely unrelated Angel Ashe incident and the pres-
ent case was the prosecutor's naked theory. 131 In other words, the court upheld
the defendant's conviction of kidnapping with the intent to commit indecent
liberties132 based solely on the testimony that he committed similar acts in the
past in an entirely unrelated incident. Application of this reasoning is tanta-
mount to trying the defendant based on his propensity to commit such acts. As
the court stated in State v. Morgan,133 the inference that the defendant acted a
certain way in the past and thus acted the same way in the present case is "pre-
cisely what is prohibited by Rule 404(b)."' 134 In previous cases, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court consistently required independent extrinsic evidence to
establish that the charged sexual crime occurred before it would admit evidence
of defendant's prior sexual wrongs. 135
Thus, the Coffey court not only abandoned the two-pronged test requiring
evidence of uncharged misconduct to be substantially similar to and not too
remote in time from the charged act, 136 but also failed to require that there be
any independent extrinsic evidence that such a similar act actually occurred in
the present case. The Coffey court disregarded its own post-rule precedents rec-
ognizing these requirements as important protections against the admission of
marginally relevant but extremely prejudicial evidence. 137 By abandoning these
important procedural prerequisites, the court has unleashed a "prosecutor's de-
light," 38 where the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence is unanchored
131. The State conceded that the Angel Ashe incident was its only evidence of the underlying
felony of kidnapping with the intent to commit indecent liberties. Brief for Respondent at 35,
Coffey, (No. 613A87). As counsel for petitioner noted, without such extrinsic evidence, "the jury is
afloat in a sea of speculation." Brief for Petitioner at 49, Coffey, (No. 613A87).
132. This conviction supported the felony-murder charge, which in turn resulted in a conviction
of first degree murder and a sentence of death. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 277, 389 S.E.2d at 53.
133. 315 N.C 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986). For a discussion of Morgan, see supra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text.
134. Id. at 638, 340 S.E.2d at 92 (emphasis added).
135. See, eg., State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 827, 370 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1988) (victim's testimony
that defendant forced her to engage in anal intercourse); State v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364
S.E.2d 118, 120 (1988) (victim testified that stepfather sexually assaulted her on four occasions);
State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 768, 340 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1986) (testimony of son that father
sexually abused him, his brother, and his sister).
Although the victim's testimony is obviously unavailable in Coffey, there are many other forms
of evidence which could have been used to prove that the victim had been sexually abused, such as
presence of semen or abnormalities in the victim's sexual organs.
136. Once the pretext of the unsupported underlying felony is sheared away, it is apparent that
the court has no firm basis on which to admit such evidence, besides propensity-masturbation in
front of a young girl has no similarity to murder. Furthermore, numerous North Carolina cases
excluded other crimes evidence with less tenuous similarities than those offered in Coffey. See, eg.,
State v. Scott, 318 N.C. 237, 248, 347 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1986) (acts of cunnilingus on three and four-
year-old nieces ruled not similar to forced intercourse with sister, the mother of the girls); State v.
Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 107-08, 305 S.E.2d 542, 545-46 (1983) (two attacks both involving the use of a
knife to force the victim to engage in oral sex occurring within Greensboro within a two month
period of each other ruled not sufficiently similar).
137. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 321 N.C. 574, 577, 364 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1988); State v. Scott, 318
N.C. 237, 244, 248, 349 S.E.2d 414, 418, 420 (1986).
138. This term comes from the characterization of uncharged misconduct evidence in a student-
written law review article. Comment, Evidence of Prior AcquittaL. An Attack on the "Prosecutors
Delight," 21 UCLA L. REv. 892, 896 (1974).
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by any protective safeguards to a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Moreover, the language of the opinion is alarmingly general and does not
appear to be limited to the particular facts in Coffey or even just to evidence of
prior sexual acts. 139 Thus, the ruling potentially could be applied to all types of
cases involving the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence. Without
the two-pronged requirements, the State may freely admit evidence of prior mis-
conduct that is dissimilar and distant in time from the charged act, so long as
the prosecutor can conceive of any possible theory under which it may be rele-
vant. Furthermore, without a requirement that there be some extrinsic evidence
of the charged crime, a prosecutor desiring to introduce evidence of a defend-
ant's uncharged behavior could merely add a plausible, related charge to the
indictment and thereby gain admittance of evidence that is damaging and highly
prejudicial to the defendant.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Coffey is significant in sev-
eral important respects. First, the court expressly adopted an inclusionary ap-
proach to rule 404(b) and rejected the traditional exclusionary approach
followed at common law. Second, the court's ruling implies that the adoption of
this broad approach to admissibility of other crimes evidence precludes the ap-
plication of the previously recognized two-pronged test which served to protect
the defendant against introduction of unrelated and unduly prejudicial evidence.
Finally, the general language of the court's opinion intimates that this holding is
not limited to the particular facts of Coffey, but could apply to all cases adjudi-
cating the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.
Strong empirical data and other states' case law support the continued ap-
plication of the exclusionary approach to uncharged misconduct evidence. 14 °
The Coffey court is bound jurisprudentially, however, to follow the North Caro-
lina General Assembly's intent to adopt an inclusionary approach in enacting
rule 404(b). Given the limited role of the courts, a better alternative to court
renunciation of legislative intent would be for the general assembly to amend
rule 404(b).141 The amendment could take into account the strong empirical
support indicating the highly prejudicial effect of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence as well as the decisions of other state courts retaining the exclusionary
approach without jeopardizing the integrity of either the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence or the North Carolina court system.
This Note recommends adoption of the following amendment, proposed by
a distinguished commentator on rule 404(b) evidence:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in con-
formity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Before the judge ad-
mits evidence for such a purpose, the proponent of the evidence must
139. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54-55.
140. See supra notes 97-102 & 103-10 and accompanying texts.
141. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 1497.
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persuade the judge that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
the danger of unfair prejudice. 142
This amendment would restore the common-law burden of proving that the
evidence should be admitted to the proponent of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence. 143 Consequently, this reformulation of rule 404(b) would recognize the
important policies behind the original adoption of the exclusionary rule by re-
establishing the presumption against admittance of this often unduly prejudicial
type of evidence.
In addition, the court should reaffirm its commitment to the requirements
of substantial similarity and proximity in time as prerequisites to admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence. These requirements serve a useful and neces-
sary purpose by guarding against untrammeled admission of propensity evi-
dence. Without these important safeguards, as the ruling in Coffey indicates,
there exists a substantial danger that the prosecutor will misuse uncharged mis-
conduct evidence essentially to put a defendant on trial for prior bad acts and
not for those crimes properly contained in the indictment.
Coffey was not a sympathetic defendant and it is difficult to be outraged by
the procedural error which occurred in this particular case. Nevertheless, this
rationale does not justify the Coffey court's ruling establishing a potentially per-
nicious precedent in this important area of evidence law. The Coffey court al-
lows the State to introduce evidence of a defendant's unrelated prior sexual acts
without any supporting extrinsic evidence that a similar act occurred in connec-
tion with the actions for which the defendant is specifically charged. This ap-
proach is contrary not only to all North Carolina precedent on the subject, but
also, and more importantly, to the fundamental postulate of the American accu-
satorial system of criminal justice-an accused can be tried only on the charges
against her.144
DOUGLAS J. BROCKER
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Cf. Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra note 79, at 713 (asserting that the exclusionary rule
originated in the accusatorial system, which requires the State to prove the defendant is guilty of a
particular crime and not merely past uncharged misconduct).
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